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It was prescient of the Michigan Telecommunications and Technol-
ogy Law Review to have organized a conference to discuss the Supreme
Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc.' As the
articles in this issue reveal, commentators have had somewhat mixed
reactions to the Grokster decision.2 Perhaps I am the most mixed (or
mixed up) about Grokster among its commentators, for I have had not
just one but three reactions to the Grokster decision.'
My first reaction was to question whether MGM and its co-plaintiffs
really won the Grokster case, or at least won it in the way they had
hoped. This question arose because MGM had propounded several theo-
ries on which it had hoped to win the case, and the Court's unanimous
decision endorsed none of them. My second reaction was to worry that
courts would take too literally the off-handed dicta in Grokster about the
* Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University
of California at Berkeley.
I. 545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. See, e.g., the comments of Michael Carroll, Niva Elkin-Koren, and Anthony Reese
in this volume.
3. If one counts the huge sigh of relief I breathed upon first reading the Court's deci-
sion, that would make four reactions.
4. See Pamela Samuelson, Did MGM Really Win the Grokster Case?, COMM. ACM, at
19 (Oct. 2005). Part I of this Article derives from that essay. For the sake of simplicity, this
essay will refer to MGM as though it was the sole plaintiff in the Grokster case; I am, how-
ever, well aware that MGM was one of many co-plaintiffs.
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relevance of filtering technologies and would impose obligations upon
makers of peer to peer and other distribution-enabling software to filter
for infringing content, even though filtering technologies cannot do the
task well enough to be worth the effort.5 Conferring with technologists
knowledgeable about filtering led me to conclude that filtering technol-
ogy is unlikely to ever be good enough to achieve the intended goal. My
third reaction emerged as I reflected upon various developments in the
first year or so after the Grokster decision, which suggested that my
fears about court-ordered technology mandates had not been borne out.
The safe harbor for technologies with substantial non-infringing uses,
established more than twenty years ago in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Uni-
versal City Studios,6 survived its toughest challenge yet in the Grokster
decision, and seems likely to continue to be the default rule for judging
secondary liability of technology developers for infringing acts of others
for the foreseeable future.7
I. FIRST REACTION: DID MGM REALLY WIN
THE GROKSTER CASE?
MGM's media blitz after the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Grokster in late June 2005 gave the impression that the entertainment
industry won an overwhelming and broad victory against peer to peer
(p2p) file sharing and file sharing technologies. MGM can, of course,
point to the 9-0 vote that vacated the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision that Grokster could not be charged with contributory infringe-
ment because it qualified for a safe harbor established by the Supreme
Court in 1984 in Sony.8 The safe harbor protects technology developers
who know, or have reason to know, that their products are being widely
used for infringing purposes, as long as the technologies have, or are
5. See Pamela Samuelson, Regulating Technical Design, COMM. ACM, at 25 (Feb.
2005). Part II of this Article derives from that essay.
6. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
7. Commentary on the Sony decision is extensive. Among the most notable contribu-
tions are Stacey Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (2001); Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55
CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 917 (2005); Mark A. Lemley & Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004); Doug-
las Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement, 16 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 395 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure? Sony Revisited, 82
B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002). My most recent contribution to the literature on Sony is Pamela
Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual Property Jurisprudence of
Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831 (2005).
8. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2783 (2005), remanded to 419 F3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005).
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capable of, substantial noninfringing uses (SNIUs). 9 The Court in Grok-
ster saw no need to revisit the Sony safe harbor.'" However, it directed
the lower courts to consider whether Grokster actively induced users to
infringe copyrights, a different legal theory.
MGM did not really want to win Grokster on an active inducement
theory. It had been so wary of this theory that it did not actively pursue it
in the lower courts. What MGM really wanted in Grokster was for the
Supreme Court to overturn or radically reinterpret the Sony decision and
eliminate the safe harbor for technologies capable of SNIUs. MGM
thought that the Supreme Court would be so shocked by the exception-
ally large volume of unauthorized up- and downloading of copyrighted
sound recordings and movies facilitated by p2p technologies, and so out-
raged by Grokster's advertising revenues-which rise as the volume of
infringing uses goes up-that it would abandon the Sony safe harbor in
favor of one of the stricter rules proposed by MGM." These stricter rules
would have given MGM and other copyright industry groups much
greater leverage in challenging disruptive technologies, such as p2p
software. Viewed in this light, MGM actually lost the case for which it
was fighting. The copyright industry's legal toolkit to challenge develop-
ers of p2p file-sharing technologies is only marginally greater now than
before the Supreme Court decided the case.
The Grokster case was sent back to the lower courts for further pro-
ceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. 2 Yet, even if the
Court had ruled in Grokster's favor, further proceedings would have
happened anyway. The only issue on which the lower courts had ruled
was whether Grokster qualified for the Sony safe harbor defense to
MGM's contributory infringement claim as to current versions of its
software. 13 Liability theories predicated on earlier versions of its soft-
ware or other conduct had not yet been considered. Upon remand,
Grokster settled with MGM,' although StreamCast did not. StreamCast
could not have been surprised by the trial court finding that it was liable
for inducing copyright infringement.
9. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
10. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
11. See Reply Brief for Motion Picture and Recording Company Petitioners, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)(No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGMvGrokster/.
12. The trial court granted MGM's motion for summary judgment against StreamCast
for inducing copyright infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,
No. CV 01-08541 SVW (PJWx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73714 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006).
13. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 FSupp.2d 1029,
1033 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
14. See, e.g., Press Release, RIAA, Music Industry Announces Grokster Settlement
(Nov. 7, 2005), http://www.riaa.connews/newsletter/l 107052.asp (last visited Nov. 29,
2006).
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Had Grokster won before the Supreme Court, MGM and copyright
industry groups would have gone immediately to Congress to insist on
technology-hostile legislation akin to the INDUCE Act sponsored by
Senators Hatch and Leahy in 2004.5 There would have been a big fight
between the technology industry and the entertainment industry over
what the legislation should look like, but some legislation would almost
certainly have ensued. Frankly, any law that would have come out of that
sausage factory would have been a lot less technology-friendly than the
Grokster decision the Supreme Court issued. Thus, the narrow victory
MGM won before the Supreme Court has deprived it-for now-of its
strongest argument for legislation to put p2p and other disruptive tech-
nology developers out of business. Insofar as MGM's goal in the
Grokster case was to persuade the courts or the Congress to give it much
stronger legal protection, it did not succeed.
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
All nine Justices joined the Grokster opinion written by Justice
Souter. The opinion began with the Court's statement of the question
presented by the case: "under what circumstances [is] the distributor of a
product capable of both lawful and unlawful use liable for acts of copy-
right infringement by third parties using the product."'6 (Compare this to
the question that MGM had asked the Court to address: "Whether the
Ninth Circuit erred in concluding ... that the Internet-based 'file shar-
ing' services Grokster and StreamCast should be immunized from
copyright liability for the millions of daily acts of copyright infringe-
ment that occur on their services and that constitute at least 90% of the
total use of the services."'7 MGM had been hoping that the Court would
say that the Sony defense didn't apply to "services" such as Grokster's
and that the estimated 90% of infringing uses on Grokster's p2p system
attested to by MGM's expert was intolerable.)
Justice Souter then succinctly stated the Court's conclusion: "one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."" The Court accepted that the Sony decision limited tech-
nology developer liability insofar as it was predicated on the design,
15. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). For a dis-
cussion of this bill, see Pamela Samuelson, Legislative Challenges to the Sony Safe Harbor
Rule, COMM. ACM, at 27 (March 2005).
16. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005).
17. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v-Grokster/.
18. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
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distribution, and uses made of an infringement-enabling technology. The
court noted, however, "where evidence goes beyond a product's charac-
teristics and uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability."' 9
(The Court drew upon patent law for this principle. Active inducers
of patent infringement cannot escape liability by showing that they are
selling a technology suitable for non-infringing uses. 20 However, merely
selling a technology suitable for non-infringing uses does not establish
active inducement of patent infringement.' The Court, thus, borrowed
patent law's staple article of commerce rule in Sony, as well as its active
inducement rule in Grokster.)
Concerning evidence of inducement, the Court said that "the record
was replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and Stream-
Cast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the
objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each
took active steps to encourage infringement."2 StreamCast, for example,
"monitored both the number of users downloading its [] program and the
number of music files they downloaded" and promoted StreamCast's
software 'as the #1 alternative to Napster."',3 StreamCast's executives
"aimed to have a larger number of copyrighted songs available on their
networks than other file-sharing networks" and provided users with the
ability to search for "Top 40" songs. 4 Grokster "sent users a newsletter
promoting its ability to provide particular copyrighted materials."
2
1
Grokster and StreamCast sought to avoid the taint of these "bad"
facts by, in effect, bifurcating the lawsuit into "then" and "now" time
periods. Grokster and StreamCast asked the lower court to rule that they
qualified for the Sony safe harbor as to current versions of their soft-
ware.26 Grokster and StreamCast were hoping that evidence of earlier
misconduct would not spill over to the more recent period during which
they had arguably cleaned up their acts. A successful Sony safe harbor
defense as to current technologies would mean that these defendants
could continue to operate while the legal proceedings dragged on as to
earlier versions of the software and other conduct. Money damage
awards subsequently imposed as to earlier versions of the software might
19. Id. at 2779.
20. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04 (2006) (discussing patent
inducement liability).
21. Id. § 17.04[3]. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
22. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
23. Id. at 2773.
24. Id. at 2773-74.
25. Id. at 2774.
26. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1033
(C.D. Cal. 2006).
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eventually force them to shut down, but a successful Sony defense would
give them an opportunity to sell ads to display to their users in the mean-
time.
During oral argument, Justice Souter expressed skepticism about this
legal strategy:
I don't understand how you can separate the past from the pre-
sent in this fashion. One, I suppose, could say, 'Well, I'm going
to make inducing remarks Monday through Thursday, and I'm
going to stop Thursday night.' The sales of the product on Friday
are still going to be the result of inducing remarks Monday
through Wednesday. And you're asking [us], in effect, . . . to ig-
nore Monday through Thursday.27
Grokster's lawyer responded that the trial court could consider
whether "past acts were themselves illegal" and whether "the causal
consequences of those past acts should somehow reach forward into the
current acts. 28 Justice Souter then questioned the point of the lower
court's ruling and characterized as "bizarre" the bifurcated theory of the
29
case.
Given this exchange, it was not at all surprising that the Court sent
the case back to consider an active inducement theory of liability. Insofar
as the Ninth Circuit's ruling in favor of Grokster could be construed as
precluding liability for current versions of the defendants' software on
any secondary liability theory because their software was capable of
SNIUs, the Court decided that the Ninth Circuit had interpreted Sony too
broadly.30
B. Why Inducement May Not Solve MGM's Problems
MGM is not all that keen to pursue inducement claims against de-
velopers of p2p and other infringement-enabling technologies because
such claims are tough to prove. Although copyright law does not have a
secondary liability provision, it was foreseeable that, when presented
with an appropriate copyright inducement case, courts would borrow an
inducement liability standard from patent law, just as the Supreme Court
had borrowed the safe harbor for SNIU technologies from patent law in
Sony. Patent law requires proof of overt acts of inducement,3' such as
advertising that actively promotes infringing uses or instruction manuals
27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/04-480.pdf.
28. Id. at 44.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
31. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 20, § 17.04[4].
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that show users how to infringe, as well as proof of a specific intent to
induce infringement. In addition, there must be underlying infringing
acts that were induced by this defendant.33 Merely making or selling an
infringement-enabling technology will not suffice to trigger inducement
liability, even if the technology is widely used for infringing purposes."
The public interest in access to the technology's non-infringing uses is
protected by the SNIU safe harbor. Moreover, some authority supports
the proposition that active inducers can continue to sell technology with
SNIUs after they stop overt acts of inducement." This strict standard will
often be difficult for the entertainment industry to meet.
MGM has been concerned that developers of p2p software will ar-
ticulate a plausible substantial non-infringing use for their technologies,
such as downloading open source software, and will be careful not to say
anything that directly encourages infringing uses. MGM believes that
they will nonetheless secretly intend to benefit from infringing uses that
ensue. If there are no overt acts of inducement and no proof of specific
intent to induce infringement, and if the Sony safe harbor continues to
shield technology developers from contributory liability, MGM will find
itself on the losing side of challenges to technology developers for in-
fringing acts of their users. That is why MGM did not really want to win
the Grokster case on this theory.
C. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer on the Sony Safe Harbor
Although the Court was unanimous about remanding the case to
consider active inducement, the Justices appear to be in three camps
about the Sony safe harbor for technologies with SNIUs. Justice Gins-
burg, writing a concurring opinion for herself and Justices Kennedy and
Rehnquist, questioned whether there was sufficient evidence in the re-
cord to conclude that Grokster's software had or was capable of SNIUs.36
Her opinion suggests that she construes the Sony safe harbor more nar-
rowly than other Justices.37 Justice Breyer, writing for himself and
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, used his concurrence to explain why he
supports preserving the Sony safe harbor.38 Justice Souter's decision for
the Court says some positive things about the Sony safe harbor, such as
32. Id. § 17.04[2].
33. Id. § 17.04[1].
34. Id. § 17.04[3].
35. Id.
36. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2784-85
(2005).
37. Id. at 2784 n. 1.
38. Id. At 2787-96.
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that "it leaves breathing room for innovation and vigorous commerce. ' "
But whether Justices Souter, Scalia and Thomas would be willing to re-
visit the Sony safe harbor in a different case remains to be seen.
Justice Ginsburg agreed with MGM that Sony was a very different
case than Grokster and that the Sony decision did not unequivocally es-
tablish blanket immunity for technologies capable of SNIUsi ° If the
Grokster case was not resolved on an active inducement theory, Justice
Ginsburg thought the lower courts should consider whether Grokster and
StreamCast should be held contributorily liable for user copyright in-
fringements because their products "were, and had been for some time,
overwhelmingly used to infringe copyrights" and "infringement was the
overwhelming source of revenue from the products."' Justice Ginsburg
questioned whether the evidence really established, as the lower courts
had opined, that Grokster had and was capable of non-infringing uses."
While she did not endorse the "primary use" standard of contributory
liability for which MGM argued, Justice Ginsburg seemed willing to
leave less breathing room for developers of infringement-enabling tech-
nologies than other members of the Court.
Justice Breyer accepted that Grokster had qualified for a Sony safe
harbor defense to charges of contributory infringement because the tech-
nology had SNIUs. 3 His concurrence mainly considered whether "MGM
has shown that Sony incorrectly balanced copyright and new-technology
interests.""' He posed three further questions to inform his answer to the
larger question: "(1) Has Sony (as I interpret it) worked to protect new
technology? (2) If so, would modification or a strict interpretation sig-
nificantly weaken that protection? (3) If so, would new or necessary
copyright-related benefits outweigh such weakening?" '"5
Justice Breyer concluded that Sony did indeed protect new technolo-
gies "unless the technology in question will be used almost exclusively
to infringe copyrights."" The Sony safe harbor "shelters VCRs, typewrit-
ers, tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact
disc burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search en-
gines, and peer-to-peer software," but not cable descramblers. The latter
may be theoretically capable of non-infringing uses, but they do not have
and are not capable of plausible SNIUs. The Sony safe harbor is good in
39. Id. at 2778.
40. Id. at 2784-85.
41. Id. at 2786.
42. Id. at 2785-86.
43. Id. at 2787-89.
44. Id. at 2791.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2791.
47. Id. at 2792.
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part because it is clear and in part because it is forward-looking. "It does
not confine its scope to a static snapshot of a product's current uses
(thereby threatening technologies that have undeveloped future mar-
kets), 48 citing VCRs as an example of a technology whose uses evolved
considerably over time. Moreover, the Sony safe harbor avoids ill-
informed judicial second-guessing of technology design decisions. ' 9
Justice Breyer concluded that modifications of the Sony safe harbor
"would significantly weaken the law's ability to protect new technol-
ogy."5° Requiring technology developers to produce "business plans,
profitability estimates, projected technological modifications, and so
forth" would increase "the legal uncertainty that surrounds the creation
or development of a new technology capable of being put to infringing
uses."5' Innovators "would have no way to predict how courts would
weigh the respective values of infringing and non-infringing uses; de-
termine the efficiency and advisability of technological changes; or
assess a product's future market."52 Because copyright law requires im-
position of statutory damages-which range from $750 to $30,000 per
infringed work even in the absence of actual damages-"the price of a
wrong guess" could be so costly that technological innovation would be
chilled.53
Justice Breyer found most difficult his third question about whether
benefits to copyright owners from a modification of Sony outweighed the
new technology interests that the Sony safe harbor had thus far protected.
While "a more intrusive Sony test would generally provide greater reve-
nue security for copyright holders," it was less clear that "the gains on
the copyright swings would exceed the losses on the technology round-
abouts."' Because Sony has been the law for more than two decades,
Justice Breyer thought that its longevity "imposes a serious burden upon
copyright holders like MGM to show a need for change in the current
rules of the game, including a more strict interpretation of the test."55 Al-
though unauthorized p2p copying probably had diminished copyright
industry revenue, Justice Breyer noted that studies of the effects of p2p
file sharing were unclear as to the extent of harm and whether creative
output had diminished. 6 Moreover, lawsuits against individual file-
sharers appear to be having some deterrent effects, and there is evidence
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2792-93.
52. Id. at 2793.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2794.
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of a steady migration of users to licensed services such as iTunes" In
view of these factors, Justice Breyer concluded that MGM had not made
a persuasive case for modifying the Sony safe harbor.
D. The Court Rejected MGM's Alternative Tests
The Court's decision not to revisit the Sony safe harbor for technolo-
gies having or capable of SNIUs was very good news for the technology
community. This aspect of the Court's decision was, in itself, a consider-
able defeat for MGM and the entertainment industry which believed the
"bad" facts of the Grokster case would be compelling enough to induce
the Court to reinterpret Sony.
Also a defeat for MGM was the Court's disinclination to adopt any
of the numerous alternative tests for secondary that MGM and those who
supported its position had proffered for the Court's consideration, such
as whether the primary use of a technology was for infringement,
whether it had been intentionally designed for infringement, whether
Grokster had a duty to build technology to thwart user infringement,
whether technology developer liability should depend on cost/benefit
analyses weighing how much infringement could have been averted by
alternative designs, whether Grokster could be held liable because its
business model was infringement-driven, and whether to use multi-factor
balancing tests in secondary liability cases." Although Justice Souter's
opinion indicated that when there is other evidence of inducement,
courts can consider technology design and business models in consider-
ing whether active inducement of infringement has occurred, 9 it also
makes clear that technology design and business models alone will not
establish inducement liability.6° Hence, as long as technology developers
do not actively induce user infringements, they can continue to innovate
and rely on the Sony safe harbor.
57. Id. at 2794-96.
58. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Motion Picture and Recording Company Petitioners, su-
pra note 11; Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Grokster,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), available at http://www.eff.org/lPJP2P/MGM_v_Grokster/;
Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges, and Justin Hughes, as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), reprinted in
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 509 (2005).
59. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
60. Id.
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II. SECOND REACTION: WILL COURTS IMPOSE FILTERING
OBLIGATIONS ON SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS?
The second phase of my reaction to Grokster began with the worry
that courts would give too much weight to the dicta in Justice Souter's
opinion that a technology developer's decision not to install filtering
technologies to guard against infringement may be considered if there is
other evidence of inducement, and too little weight to the cautionary
footnote which said that failure to install filters would, by itself, be insuf-
ficient to establish secondary liability.
62
This is troublesome given that no one knows how much evidence of
inducement must exist before courts will start looking at technical de-
sign. Litigation threats have caused some p2p developers to start
redesigning their systems. LimeWire, for example, has begun reconfigur-
ing its p2p technology to block the exchange of files for which it cannot
verify authorization. SNOCAP is one of a number of firms offering
services to help p2p developers filter infringing files from their sys-
tems.64
Before bowing to RIAA pressure to install filters, technologists and
technology lawyers should realize that courts in the US have not im-
posed a duty to embed filters or other infringement-inhibiting features in
general purpose information technologies. Although MGM sprinkled its
briefs with references to Grokster's failure to filter, there was no evi-
dence before the Court about the feasibility or effectiveness of filtering
technologies. 65 There are many reasons to doubt whether filters will pre-
vent copyright infringement to a meaningful degree. Courts should be
very cautious in considering technical design, including decisions not to
filter, as a factor in secondary liability cases.66
61. Id. at 2781
62. Id. at 2781 n.12. For conflicting views of product design as a basis for secondary
liability, cf. Matthew D. Brown, Orion Armon, Lori Ploeger, & Michael Traynor, Secondary
Liability for Inducing Infringement After MGM v. Grokster: Infringement Prevention and
Product Design, J. INTERNET L., at 21 (Dec. 2005); Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The
Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE WES. RES. L.
REV. 749 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Thomas Mennecke, LimeWire Works to Block Unlicensed Material, SLYCK
NEWS, Sept. 25, 2005, http://www.slyck.com/news.php?story=927.
64. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Putting the Napster Genie Back in the Bottle, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2005, at B I.
65. On remand, the trial court considered StreamCast's failure to filter as among the
factors supporting its liability for inducing infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., No. CV 01-08541 SVW (PJWx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73714, at 73-
79 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006).
66. StreamCast argued that filtering was infeasible, but the court responded: "Even if
filtering technology does not work perfectly and contains negative side effects on usability, the
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A. Arguments for Requiring P2P Developers to Install Filters
Filtering came up in the Grokster case in several ways: MGM argued
that Grokster was vicariously liable for user infringements because it
could have designed its technology to inhibit user infringements by in-
stalling filters.67 An amicus curiae brief submitted by several economists
urged the Supreme Court to impose liability on technology developers if
their failure to adopt alternative technical designs, such as filtering, en-
abled a large volume of infringement.68 SNOCAP and Audible Magic
argued in amicus curiae briefs that they could provide filtering capabili-
ties for p2p developers.69
The main argument for filtering goes like this: Technologists are
well-positioned to design products to prevent or inhibit infringing uses.
Developers of p2p technologies, in particular, have reason to know their
products will be used for infringing purposes. By not designing products
that block infringing uses, technology developers impose huge costs on
copyright owners. Making technologists build products that limit unau-
thorized copying would force them to internalize costs they are imposing
on the copyright owners.
The entertainment industry also believes technology firms should be
responsible because they make substantial profits from selling technolo-
gies that they have reason to know will be widely used to infringe
copyrights. The market for information technology products is substan-
tially larger because these products enable infringements. The more
infringing uses or users there are for a technology, the larger will be its
revenues. The entertainment industry considers much of the technology
industry as "infringement-driven.
' 70
B. Computer Scientist BriefArgument Against Filtering
Seventeen computer scientists-including luminaries such as Hal
Abelson, Dan Boneh, David Clark, David Farber, Edward Felten, and
fact that a defendant fails to make some effort to mitigate abusive use of its technology may
still support an inference of intent to encourage infringement." Id. at 76-77.
67. See Reply Brief for Motion Picture and Recording Company Petitioners, supra note
11, at 44-49.
68. See Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al. in Support of Petitioners, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)(No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM v-Grokster/ (listed as "Brief of Law and Economics Profes-
sors").
69. See Brief of Amici Curiae [sic] SNOCAP, Inc. in Support of Neither Party,
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM v_
Grokster/; Brief Amici Curiae of Audible Magic, Digimarc, and Gracenote in Support of Nei-
ther Party, available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM vGrokster/.
70. Reply Brief for Motion Picture and Recording Company Petitioners, supra note
11, at 2.
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Eugene Spafford-submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in
the Grokster case.7 The brief pointed out that the filtering technology for
which MGM was arguing was as yet untested and unproven. Apart from
self-interested assertions in the SNOCAP and Audible Magic briefs,
there was no evidence that filters would be "effective in distinguishing
infringing and non-infringing files if deployed in conjunction with soft-
ware such as [Grokster's]. '72
MGM's suggested filtering strategy would, the brief noted, "require
filtering software to be installed on users' computers."73 The brief ques-
tioned whether users would adopt updates of software with filters built
in. Even after uploading filtering software, users might uninstall it. "End
users ultimately have control over which software is on their com-
puters"
74
The brief also raised concerns about the distorting effects that a fil-
tering obligation would have on the technical design decision-making.
"To order network designers to add functionality to the network to avoid
liability is to force significant inefficiencies into network design. 75 Peer
to peer technologies offer some important advantages for communica-
tions networks, such as enhanced robustness, which filters will
undermine. Omitting filters from one's technology "may represent good
conservative engineering."
76
The brief predicted that a filtering obligation would "kick off an
open-ended arms race between the filter designers and non-compliant
users [to defeat the filters]., 77 Filters can be defeated. Napster, for exam-
ple, made intensive efforts to develop filtering software to block
exchanges of infringing files after the Ninth Circuit said that it would be
liable for infringements it did not block.8 Users easily evaded file-name
filters (e.g., by typing N-i-r-v-a-n-a instead of Nirvana).79 Napster also
filtered for fingerprints and hashes, but they too were evaded by techni-
cally sophisticated users. Napster argued that it was doing its best to
upgrade its filters in response to evasion by users, but the trial judge
overseeing the case ordered Napster to shut down unless it could filter at
or near perfection (even though the Ninth Circuit had said perfection was
71. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Computer Science Professors Harold Abelson et al.
Suggesting Affirmance of the Judgment, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)(No. 04-480), avail-
able at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-vGrokster/.
72. Id. at 14-15.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 16.
78. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).
79. Id. at 1097.
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not necessary). ° Notwithstanding the concerted efforts of Napster's en-
gineers and many highly skilled consultants, Napster was unable to
consistently filter at this level and it shut down.8'
Filtering technology has since advanced. Today's filters focus on
fingerprints (unique samples from audio files) or watermarks (hidden
information to identify a file). Yet, given the technical sophistication of
many users of digital information and the availability of digital networks
to share information and electronic tools, it is foreseeable that water-
mark- and fingerprint-based filters will be defeated without undue
difficulty.
82
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Grokster mentioned the com-
puter scientist brief as casting doubt on filters as a workable solution to
peer to peer file sharing.83 But Justice Souter and others on the Court
seem to have taken MGM at its word that filtering is possible. If some
developers adopt filtering systems, judges may believe that filters have
some utility in limiting infringement. To the arms race issue, judges may
respond that efforts to defeat watermarks and fingerprints may violate
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),4 and so can be regu-
lated by this law.
C. Other Reasons to Doubt Filtering Can Work
The problems with filtering go beyond those discussed in the com-
puter scientist brief. Among other problems are these: (1) when
developers should consider filters and why; (2) the interdependence of
software components and implications of filters for redesigns; (3) figur-
ing out what to filter; (4) where filters should reside in software; (5)
whether to allow unmarked files to be exchanged (as iMesh is doing with
its "grey stars" program);" (6) what to do with legacy data; (7) how to
keep filters adequately up-to-date; (8) whether a developer would have to
extend the filters to all forms of copyrighted works; (9) the global nature
80. Id. at 1098.
81. Id. at 1099.
82. Professor Edward Felten and some colleagues and students were able to easily
defeat watermarks used to protect digital music when they took the Secure Digital Music
Initiative "hacker challenge." See Lisa Bowman, Researchers Face Legal Threats Over SDMI
Hack, CNET NEws, April 23, 2001, http://news.com.com/Researchers+face+legal+threats+
over+SDMI+hack/2100-1023_3-256277.html. See also Chris Palmer, Audible Magic-No
Silver Bullet for P2P Infringement, EFFoRG, July 12, 2004, http://www.eff.org/share/
audible-magic.php.
83. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792 (2005).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
85. See, e.g., iMesh Authorized P2P Available for Beta Testing, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC,
Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.futureofmusicbook.com/2005/10/index.html.
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of the Internet and the local nature of any US requirement for filtering;
(10) and uncertainty about who should bear the costs of filtering.
Let's say a firm is developing a p2p technology for some legitimate
purpose (e.g., to enable faster downloads of open source software), but it
knows the technology is capable of infringing uses.86 It can take comfort
in the Supreme Court's Grokster decision insofar as it recognizes advan-
tages of p2p technology and states that a developer has no duty to install
filters. Should the firm consider installing filters solely out of concern
that its technology might be misused or out of fear that RIAA will sue it?
If the firm builds in filters, it will cost a lot more to develop the
technology and may make it perform less well. Insofar as filters over-
block content (e.g., block files that lack authorization mark-up, but are
non-infringing) or insofar as filters slow down the performance of the
technology, a developer may worry that users will choose alternative
technologies that perform better because they do not filter. Insofar as the
firm's filters under-block content (e.g., files with watermarks that the
filter did not catch), it might worry that RIAA will still sue it. There may
be little point in building filters if it means having fewer customers or if
doing so will not protect a firm against a lawsuit. How well will filters
have to work before a company will be insulated from liability?
Now assume the firm developed a great technology without filters
that becomes widely adopted. Assume further that fans start using it to
download a large volume of copyrighted movies or sound recordings. At
this point, does the firm say to itself "hey, I didn't induce any of this in-
fringement and my technology has a substantial non-infringing use, so
I've got nothing to worry about," or does it start thinking about how it
could redesign the technology to install filters or whether the firm should
strike a deal with a commercial filtering service?
To redesign the technology to install filters would be costly and
time-consuming. The developer would have many decisions to make,
including what to filter for, whether to allow unmarked materials to pass
through the filter (because they could be infringing copies), whether to
use a commercial firm such as SNOCAP as a filtering service, how fil-
ters will work with other components of the technology, and how much
redesign of other components will be necessary to accommodate the fil-
ters. It will not be simple to figure out how much such a redesign will
cost, but assume this could be done.
Can the developer also figure out how much copyright infringement
the filters will avert and how much filtering would reduce entertainment
industry losses? Judge Posner's cost-benefit test in Aimster calls for such
86. Brief Amicus Curiae of Computer Science Professors, supra note 71, at 12-13
(giving BitTorrent as an example).
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a calculation. 7 The comparative losses are to be weighed against the
costs of installing infringement-inhibiting technologies such as filters. If
the cost of installing infringement-inhibiting technology is not "dispro-
portionately costly" as compared with infringement averted,88 Aimster
says a technology developer that chooses not to adopt the inhibiting de-
sign should be secondarily liable for user infringements.89
If a firm is not confident its filters will be perfect (and how could
they be?), it will soon discover how difficult it is to calculate the losses a
filter would avert. Should the developer measure possible copyright
damages by figuring out how much it would have cost users to buy
swapped songs on iTunes or Rhapsody, by the average settlement
amount per infringement obtained in lawsuits that RIAA has brought
against individual file-sharers, or by copyright law's statutory damages
rules?
Copyright law says that courts must award statutory damages if
copyright owners want to receive them.9 Against non-willful infringers,
courts can award damages anywhere between $750 and $30,000 per in-
fringed work, as it deems just. Against willful infringers, courts can
award damages up to $150,000 per infringed work.9'
If the technology is used by millions of people and billions of files
are exchanged through its use, it doesn't take a genius to realize that
possible copyright "losses" measured in terms of statutory damages-
what RIAA will argue for-would yield a very large number. The cost of
redesigning a technology to install filters, in comparison, would almost
certainly be much smaller.
Insofar as courts followed Judge Posner's analysis in Aimster, a non-
filtering technology developer would likely flunk the disproportionately
costly test. If a judge decided that the firm should have installed filters,
those same statutory damages will be sought against the technology's
developer. This does not seem fair, especially if the firm made a good
faith judgment that filters will not be effective.
Then there is the update issue. How can a developer build a filter
that will stay up to date with identifying information for all copyrighted
works released in the future? RIAA firms may install watermarks into
their existing inventory of sound recordings. Even if a developer could
incorporate them into its filters, it would have a never-ending job of
87. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 649-50 (7th Cir. 2003).
88. Id.
89. The Supreme Court did not endorse, but did not explicitly repudiate, the Aimster
cost-benefit test.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3).
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keeping up with all the watermarks for works released in the future.9 2 A
similar update problem would arise as to fingerprints.
SNOCAP wants to solve the update problem by providing filtering
services for p2p and other developers. It has obtained identifying infor-
mation for many digital recordings. There are, of course, some
advantages if one firm is able to provide filtering technology for p2p de-
velopers. SNOCAP may aspire to become a proprietary standard in this
market. But will one filtering company really be able to filter all files
transmitted via p2p networks? Who will be responsible if copyrighted
works are not successfully filtered out? What if SNOCAP's servers
crash? Is a single technology a magnet for hacker attacks to defeat it?
Would such a firm be in the position to charge monopoly rents and oth-
erwise abuse monopoly power?
Attention thus far has mainly been focused on p2p sharing of sound
recordings, but p2p technologies can be used to download motion pic-
tures, software and other digital works. Perhaps all commercial
copyrighted works in digital form will need to be fingerprinted or wa-
termarked. It will be daunting, if not impossible, to filter for all
commercially distributed copyrighted content available on the Internet.
The task of building effective filters is even more daunting when one
considers that the Internet is a global communications network. The laws
of some nations might require p2p developers to install filters, but other
nations may not. This simple fact has consequences for whether local
laws can be effective.
The only existing international consensus about secondary liability
for copyright infringement is that liability should not be imposed merely
because a firm provided the facilities used for infringement, whether
those facilities are Internet access or p2p technology. Some nations have
no secondary liability rules; some have more limited rules than the US. A
Dutch court, for example, rejected a secondary liability claim against the
KaZaa p2p service for user infringements.3 Yet, an Australian trial court
recently held Sharman Networks, KaZaa's owner, liable for user copy-
right infringements, finding that KaZaa had a duty to filter for
copyrighted materials under Australian law.94 (The latter ruling is on ap-
peal.)
92. There is also a serious legacy issue with watermarks because of the enormous vol-
ume of copies of sound recordings out there that are not watermarked.
93. See Brian Grow, Netherlands Court Ruling Offers Haven to File-Sharing Services,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at B7.
94. See Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., 2005
FCA 124. Commentators differ in their assessment of this case. Cf Jonathan Band & Matt
Schurer, Grokster in the International Arena, 2006 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L 6, available at
http://www.policybandwidth.com/doc/GroksterCRI.pdf; Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson,
Inducers and Authorisers: A Comparison of the US Supreme Court's Grokster Decision and
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Firms can respond to conflicting national rules by moving their de-
velopment facilities to a jurisdiction where technologists can not be held
responsible for user infringements. They would then be free to design
innovative technologies without filters. They could still disseminate the
technology throughout the world cheaply and rapidly via the Internet
because software can be downloaded from a site where it is lawful.95
Even if a developer doesn't relocate, and even if it installs filters,
new versions of the technology minus the filters, or open source clones
of the technology minus the filters, may still crop up and be dissemi-
nated via the Internet. eMule, for example, is a new open source version
of the eDonkey technology. Moreover, as the lower courts realized in
Grokster,96 users who already have p2p software on their hard drives can
continue to use it to file-share even if Grokster and other p2p developers
are forced to shut down.
There are, in sum, many reasons to question whether filtering is a
workable solution to limiting copyright infringement by users of p2p or
other distributional technologies. The courts should, therefore, give little
weight to the Supreme Court's off-hand and ill-informed statement about
inferring inducement of infringement from failure to install filtering
technologies.
III. THIRD REACTION: No CRISIS So FAR
As Section I explained, my immediate reaction to the Grokster deci-
sion was to question whether MGM had won as much of a victory as it
claimed. By the winter of 2005-06, the bleak aftermath of the Court's
filtering dicta struck me like an ice storm. I then spent several months
worrying that courts would mandate installation of filtering features in
infringement-enabling technologies. As I prepared to give the talk on
which this Article is based at the Michigan conference on Grokster and
as I reflected on what had (and had not) happened in the year or so since
the Grokster decision, things did not seem so bad.
One important development is that a number of p2p file sharing
companies whose products had been widely used for infringement have
shut down, including Grokster, StreamCast, LimeWire, and eDonkey.
But in light of the Court's analysis of inducing acts in Grokster, these
the Australian Federal Court's KaZaa Ruling, 11 MEDIA & ARTS L. REv. 1 (2006), available at
http://ssm.conabstract=888928.
95. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can
Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 229-230 (2004) (giving p2p file sharing
technologies as an example of such arbitrage).
96. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 FSupp.2d 1029,
1041 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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shutdowns were to be expected. Technology developers who induce
copyright infringement should not expect to be treated any differently
than those who induce patent infringement. Yet, the entertainment indus-
try has neither sued nor shut down all of p2p file sharing services. 97 It
appears, moreover, that the Grokster decision has not stopped or even
slowed down p2p file-sharing.98
Larry Lessig, among others, has suggested that the Grokster decision
will have a chilling effect on innovation." I respectfully disagree. Many
technology companies are continuing to offer innovative products and
services in the industry, the entertainment industry has generally re-
frained from challenging new technologies that can make or distribute
copies of copyrighted works." Moreover, legislation to overturn or mod-
ify the Supreme Court's inducement standard has not been introduced in
Congress.
As long as the courts apply high standards for inducement liability-
requiring proof of overt acts of inducement, underlying acts of infringe-
ment, and a specific intent to induce infringement, as patent law requires
and Grokster directs'°'-there should be ample room for innovative tech-
nologies to continue to thrive. Engineers will need to watch what they
say during the development process, and firms will need to think care-
fully about how they should go about building markets for their products
and services. But these firms should probably be exercising such care
even without the Court's guidance about inducement liability.
Technologists and technology lawyers must recognize that the enter-
tainment industry still wants courts to closely scrutinize many technical
design decisions that arguably facilitate copyright infringement, including
those that enable faster transmissions of data, larger data storage capacity,
anonymous file transfers, and playful uses of content that arguably allow
creation of derivative works. For example, the entertainment industry
97. BitTorrent, for example, is still in operation, even though some had worried it might
be vulnerable to litigation after Grokster. For a discussion as to why, see, e.g., Mark Schultz,
What Happens to BitTorrent After Grokster?, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING LAW BLOG,
June 28, 2005, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/what happens-to.htm.
98. See, e.g., John Boudreau, Illegal File Sharing Showing No Letup, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEWS, July 3, 2006, at E3.
99. See, e.g., Rob Hof, Larry Lessig: Grokster Decision Will Chill Innovation, Business
Week Online, June 28, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/techbeat/archives/
2005/06/larry-lessig-gr.html. See also Fred von Lohmann, Remedying Grokster, LAW.COM,
July 25, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1122023112436.
100. See, e.g., Ernest Miller, Prediction: No Lawsuit Against Slingbox, CORANTE, July 5,
2005, available at http://importance.corante.comarchives/2005/07/07/prediction-no-lawsuit_
againstslingbox.php. But see CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., POST GROKSTER SECONDARY
LIABILITY DEVELOPMENTS (Oct. 2006), http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20061023post-grokster-
developments.pdf (summarizing decisions rendered and lawsuits pending).
101. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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charged ClearPlay with secondary infringement because its software en-
abled people to bypass sex, violence, and indecent language in DVD
movies; this lawsuit was dismissed after Congress created a safe harbor
for such software.' °2
The entertainment industry is especially determined to regulate in-
fringement-enabling digital technologies. Its plans suffered one setback
in Grokster and another when a federal appellate court struck down the
FCC's "broadcast flag" rule on grounds that the FCC lacked jurisdiction
to impose a requirement on makers of technologies capable of process-
ing digital TV signals to conform to the "flag" (encoded information
about authorized uses of the content).' °3 But this industry has not given
up on regulating infringement-enabling technologies. It has asked Con-
gress to give the FCC jurisdiction to impose technical protection
mandates for technologies capable of receiving or processing digital ra-
dio and television signals.'04
Grokster may thus be only the first step in the next stage of the on-
going legal and policy debate about whether technical design should be
regulated to protect the entertainment industry. If so, it may be too early
to be complacent about the preservation of the Sony safe harbor for tech-
nologies with substantial non-infringing uses and capabilities, because
the entertainment industry is still at war against it. Yet, for now and for
some years to come, the Sony safe harbor will stand. In fact, Sony stands
firmer now than before the Grokster decision because a unanimous
Court perceived no need to revisit it, and recognized its importance in
promoting innovation and commerce.
102. See Press Release, ClearPlay, ClearPlay Freed From Hollywood Litigation (Aug.
18, 2005), http://www.clearplay.com/Press.aspx?pid=19.
103. Am. Library Ass'n v. Fed. Comm'cns Comm'n, 406 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
104. Communications, Consumers Choice & Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686,
109th Cong. §§ 451-54 (2006). See also American Library Association, "Broadcast Flag"
Rulemaking, http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/copyrightb/broadcastflag/ broadcastflag.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2006) (discussing the background of the Communications, Consumers
Choice & Broadband Deployment Act of 2006 legislation, and hearings held on this subject).
